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(decided August 14, 1990)
This case involved a request by the New York City Police
Department to quash subpoenas duces tecum issued by the court
to the Legal Aid Society for their representation in ten separate
cases. 347 The subpoenaed materials for each case involved rou-
tine, non-confidential police reports "concerning the defendants'
charges, and their arrest photographs.", 348 The New York City
Police Department argued that the routine reports were "not
legally available to (the] defendants under pretrial discovery
rules, or as Rosario material[,] until a hearing or trial" 349 and
therefore, should not be made available through the use of a
subpoena. 350 The defense claimed that the materials "are
essential for trial preparation" since the reports may contain
exculpatory evidence that may never reach trial.35 1 Thus, if the
subpoenas are quashed invalidly, a due process violation would
result.352
The court held that it would be improper to quash the subpoe-
nas because a defendant is entitled to know before trial the exis-
tence of any exculpatory evidence, including potential evidence
that may be contained in the police reports. 35 3 The subpoenaed
material must be specifically requested by the defense and must
meet the materiality standard defined in People v. Wlardi,354
which is a showing of a reasonable possibility that the material
346. 148 Misc. 2d 260, 560 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1990).
347. Id. at 260-61, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 371.




352. Id. at 264, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
353. Id. at 272, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
354. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
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would make a difference in the outcome of the trial. 355
The court began its reasoning by noting that New York shares
the federal view356 that the trial judge possesses the discretion
"to grant pretrial access of subpoenaed materials to both
defendant and prosecutor for trial preparation." ' 357 Additionally,
the court stated that the general rule in New York requires
subpoenaed evidence to be both "relevant and material to the
determination of guilt or innocence."' 358 The most essential
element of materiality is whether "the information subpoenaed
would make a favorable difference to the seeking party in the
outcome of the trial if disclosed." 359 If the seeking party meets
this burden of materiality, the court is not bound by "statutory
discovery limitations," ' 360 but, rather, may grant the subpoenas
under considerations of due process.
The court likened the defense requests in the present case to the
requests in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie.361 Both cases involved re-
quests for materials that might be favorable to defendants and that
might never reach trial if not subpoenaed. The Cabon court
noted that requests must be for specific materials and may not be
for generalized, unsupervised searches of the government's ma-
terials. 362
Because the police reports contain exculpatory evidence and
were specifically requested, the court evaluated the requests in
light of the court of appeals' holding in People v. Vilardi.363 In
Vilardi, materiality was defined as a "reasonable possibility" that
the requested evidence could contribute to the verdict. 364 The
prosecution's failure to disclose the material after a specific
request will lead to reversible error in New York if it is shown
355. Id. at 77, 555 N.E.2d at 920, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
356. FED. R. CrIM. P. 17(c).
357. Cabon, 148 Misc. 2d at 262, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
358. Id. at 262, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 372 (citing People v. Gissendanner, 48
N.Y.2d 543, 548, 399 N.E.2d 924, 927, 423 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (1979)).
359. Id. at 263, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
360. Id. at 265, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
361. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
362. Cabon, 148 Misc. 2d at 264, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
363. 76 N.Y.2d 67, 555 N.E.2d 915, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1990).
364. See supra note 209-10 and accompanying text.
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"that the failure to disclose contributed to the verdict." 365 This
places a heightened duty on the prosecutor during pretrial
discovery.3 66 In Cabon, Judge Leibovitz specifically stated that
"[t]he Vilardi rule, in my view, applies not only to pretrial
discovery, but now places a newly heightened responsibility on
the court, as well as the prosecution, when the defense makes a
specific request for police records by subpoena." 367
Additionally, the prosecutor must err on the side of disclosure
because of the Vilardi holding. 368
The court ended its opinion by specifically detailing the proce-
dure to be followed regarding materials subpoenaed specifically
by a defendant. 369 First, the materials will be received by the
court's clerks but will not be delivered to the defense until three
days later so that the prosecutor may have a reasonable inspection
period. 370 Second, within that three day period the prosecutor
may make any necessary redactions to protect his witnesses. 37 1
Third, after the three day period, the materials will be delivered
to the defense unless the prosecutor "affirmatively represents to
the court on the record that [the prosecutor] has inspected the
subpoenaed items and that they contain nothing material to the
defense under the test of materiality in People v. Vilardi.",372
365. Cabon, 148 Misc. 2d at 265, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
366. Id. at 266, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 270, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 376. Judge Leibovitz also discussed the
types of exculpatory information that may be available in police reports, for
example, testimony from witnesses who may not appear at trial and, therefore,
may remain unknown to the defendant. Id. He also evaluated the debate
concerning whether police reports are actually evidence or only potential
evidence, and concluded that any potentially exculpatory material should be
disclosed, including "exculpatory leads." Id. at 270, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 377;
see People v. Morrison, 148 Misc. 2d 61, 559 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (Crim. Ct.
New York County 1990); People v. Lumpkin, 141 Misc. 2d 581, 533
N.Y.S.2d 792 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 1988).
369. Cabon, 148 Misc. 2d at 272-73, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
370. Id. at 272, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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